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JUVENILE JUSTICE:
IS JUVENILE COURT DELINQUENCY
JURISDICTION OBSOLETE?
STEPHEN WIZNER* AND MARY F. KELLER**
I
An inability to reconcile society's need for protection from
juvenile crime with the use of nonpunitive measures has troubled the
juvenile justice system since its inception. Society long ago adopted a
paternalistic attitude toward juvenile crime, treating such behavior
not as a question of law enforcement, but as a social and psychological
problem requiring therapeutic interventions and state assumption of
parental rights and duties.1 The juvenile court was conceived as a
kind of social welfare agency rather than as an instrument for the
enforcement of the criminal laws. With the mantle of benevolence
bestowed and in the name of "individualized treatment," the juvenile
courts were given broad jurisdiction over both criminal and non-
criminal misbehavior and were vested with virtually unlimited discre-
tion to impose limitations and sanctions on a child's conduct 2 They
were to operate a "no fault" process, geared to providing treatment
and rehabilitation to children whose overt misbehavior manifested
underlying problems. 3 Juvenile court procedures were to be infor-
mal and nonadversarial, and the court was to make dispositions based
on the best interests of the child. 4
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1 See A. PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS 67-74 (1969). See generally THE CHILD, TIlE CLINIC
AND THE COURT (J. Addams ed. 1925). A good history of the juvenile court and Its working
principles may be found in E. Ryerson, Between Justice and Compassion: The Rise and Fall or
the Juvenile Court (1970) (unpublished doctoral dissertation in Yale Law Library) (to be pub-
lished in April 1978 by Hill & Wang as THE BEST LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT
EXPERIMENT).
2 See Hazard, The Jurisprudence of Juvenile Deviance, in PURSUING JUSTICE FOi% TlE
CHILD 4-6 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1976); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L, REV. 104, 107
(1909).
3 Mack, supra note 2, at 109-10.
4 Id. at 109-10, 119-20. These features of the juvenile court were accompanied by
euphemistic terminology in which an indictment was a "petition"; a prosecutor a "court advo-
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The unique features of this system as an approach to deviant
behavior are its lack of significant concern with fault or blame; 5 its
jurisdiction over noncriminal behavior such as truancy and a failure
to obey one's parents; 6 its informality and lack of procedural
technicalities; 7 and its approach to rehabilitation, exemplified by a
system of indeterminate sentencing in which type and duration of
sanction is based on the needs and "best interests" of the offender
rather than the seriousness of the offense. 8
It is now commonly agreed that the juvenile court has failed to
achieve its objectives. It has neither provided adequate protection for
society from juvenile crime nor succeeded in rehabilitating young of-
fenders.9  It has compromised important legal values' 0 and inter-
vened excessively into the lives of children and their families." And
perhaps its principal failure is the lack of proportionality in the sen-
tencing provisions of the juvenile delinquency statutes. Some criminal
offenses committed by persons of juvenile court age are so serious
that the maximum sentences authorized by these statutes 12 are insuf-
ficient to punish the offender, protect the community, and vindicate
cate", a defense lawyer a "law guardian"; a guilty verdict a "finding"; a sentence a "disposition";
a jail a "detention center" or "receiving home"; a prison a "school"; a cell a "room"; and solitary
confinement "intensive treatment."
5 Id. at 119-20.
6 Hazard, supra note 2, at 4-6.
7 Mack, supra note 2, at 109-10.
8 Id. at 109-10, 119-20; see Hazard, supra note 2, at 11-13.
9 See PREsmEr's COmihnssIoN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADIUNiSTnATION OF Jus-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JuvENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRtitE 7-9 (19M7) [hereinafter
TASK FORCE REPORT]; F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUsTIcE 51-55 (1964); E.
SCHUR, RADICAL NoNINTERVENTIoN 3-5 (1973).
Indeed, the situation is such that-
[Jluveniles now represent almost half the crime problem in this country. Children be-
tween the ages of 10 and 17 compose only 16 percent of the national population, yet
they account for more than 48 percent of all arrests for serious crimes. And the problem
is even worse than these figures indicate, because a large proportion of adult arrests for
serious crimes are those we ailed to rehabilitate as young offenders.
Our dismal failure to rehabilitate is dramatically clear from the recidivism rate for
juvenile delinquents, estimated at 74 percent to 85 percent.
118 CONG. REC. 3046 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); cf. Martinson, What Works?-Questions
and Answers About Prison Reform, PUB. ITiRE.T, Spring 1974, at 22, 25, 48.49 (discussing
failure of rehabilitation programs in adult prison systems to reduce recidivism rates).
10 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-21 (197).
22 Note, Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YALE LJ. 1383, 1397-1402
(1974) [hereinafter Note, Ungovernability].
12 See, e.g.,N.Y. FA.m. Cr. ACT § 753-a(3) (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978) (five year maxi-
mum sentence); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-323 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978) (lesser of three
years or maximum adult sentence).
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moral principles inherent in the criminal law. Conversely, interven-
tion in cases involving minor or noncriminal misbehavior often results
in the imposition of sanctions related neither to the gravity of the
offense nor to the good of the child. 13 The disproportionality prob-
lem is exacerbated by the informality of juvenile court procedures
and the judge's unfettered discretion which permit widely varying
outcomes on similar facts.
In large measure, these failures can be traced to the unrealistic
assumptions that underlay the juvenile justice system, such as the
belief that the court could act as a substitute for the parent in per-
forming certain child-rearing functions. There is no meaningful simi-
larity between a state's acting to protect society and enforce morality
through prosecution and sentencing of offenders, and parents' acting
to nurture and socialize children through love, care, discipline, and
education. The coercive nature of court-imposed "therapy" inevitably
renders it punitive from the child's viewpoint. However benevolently
it is intended, involuntary restriction of an individual's liberty be-
cause he has engaged in conduct deemed unacceptable is punish-
ment.14 Similarly, the traditional pretense that the problems of
juvenile delinquency can be cured with love and understanding is
naive and simplistic. The causes of youth crime are so deeply rooted
in the poverty and the social disorganization of urban communities,"
in the family,' 6 and in the individual personality,1 7 that even the
best-intentioned efforts of kindly judges, friendly probation officers,
and humane correctional personnel are unavailing in many cases.
13 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 25.
14 As one commentator has observed:
It is important... to recognize that when, in an authoritative setting, we attempt to
do somethingfor a child "because of what he is and needs," we are also doing somothing
to him. The semantics of "socialized justice" are a trap for the unwary. Whatovor one's
motivations, however elevated one's objectives, if the measures taken result In the com-
pulsory loss of the child's liberty, the involuntary separation of a child from his family, or
even the supervision of a child's activities by a probation worker, the Impact on the
affected individuals is essentially a punitive one. Good intentions and a flexible vocabu-
lary do not alter this reality. This is particularly so when, as is often the case, the Institu-
tion to which the child is committed is, in fact, a peno-custodlal establishment. We shall
escape much confusion here if we are willing to give candid recognition to the fact that
the business of the juvenile court inevitably consists, to a considerable degree, In dis-
pensing punishment. If this is true, we can no more avoid the problem of unjust
punishment in the juvenile court than in the criminal court.
F. ALLEN, supra note 9, at 18 (emphasis in original).
15 C. SHAW, DELINQUENCY AREAS (1929); C. SHAW & H. MCKAY, JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY AND URBAN AREAS (rev. ed. 1969).
16 T. Hinscm, CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY 83-109 (1969).
1 E. Ryerson, supra note 1, at 128-68.
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Recommendations for reform of the juvenile justice system have
generally called for procedural reforms,' improved treatment and
facilities, 19 and experimentation.20 These solutions, however, do not
affect the unbridled discretion of juvenile courts to intervene in the
lives of children and their families and to impose coercive sanctions
disproportionate to the behavior that triggered its jurisdiction. Rec-
ognizing this, other commentators have gone further and proposed
restricting juvenile court jurisdiction 2 1 -an approach adopted in
large measure in the volumes of proposed standards produced by the
IJA-ABA Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards (Joint
Commission).22
The standards contained in the three volumes under review
here-Juvenile Delinquency and Sanctions, Dispositions, and Dis-
posiiional Procedures-propose four general principles to meet the
problems engendered by the current system of juvenile court juris-
diction. First, the standards provide that juvenile court delinquency
jurisdiction should be limited to acts which, if committed by an adult,
would constitute a crime, thereby abolishing jurisdiction over so-called
"'status offenses" such as truancy and incorrigibility.23 Second, the
standards create defenses and mitigations related to fault, degree of
culpability, and actual harm,24 thus rejecting the "no fault" basis of
the current juvenile justice system in favor of notions common to the
"adult" criminal justice system. Third, the standards restrict disposi-
tional discretion by limiting the type and duration of sanctions2s and
by requiring that the severity of the disposition be proportional to the
18 See, e.g., F. ATIN, supra note 9, at 16-24, 54-56; Wizner, The Child and the State:
Adversaries in the Juvenile Justice System, 4 CoLmt. HumtA RIGHTs L. REv. 3S9, 395-99
(1972) [hereinafter Wizner, The Child and the State].
19 J. PoLER, A Vrsw FROM THE BENCH (1964).
20 Stapleton, A Social Scientist's View of Cault and a Plea for the Experimenting Society, I
YALE REv. L. & Soc. ACT., Winter 1970, at 72, 79-80. But see Teitelbaum, Gault and the
"Experimenting Society"- A Response to Mr. Stapleton, I YALE REv. L & Soc. Acr., Winter
1970, at 86, 89-90 (the "experimenting society" must sedulously respect the child's right to
resist state intervention); Wizner, Juvenile Justice and the Rehabilitative Ideal: A Response to
Mr. Stapleton, 1 YALE REV. L. & SOC. Acr., Winter 1970, at 82, 84-85 (experimentation with
juvenile justice system must safeguard child's due process rights).2 1 See, e.g., P. MurpHY, OUR KINDLY PAENT-THE STATE 174 (1974); McCarthy, Should
Juvenile Delinquency Be Abolished?, 23 CRnm- & DEIrNQuENCY 196, 203 (1977).
2 INsTrruTE OF JuDiciAL AmMaISTRATION & Ammic_ BAn AsSOCLATION, JuvENMX
JusTCE STANDARDS PioJECr (Tent. Draft 1977) [hereinafter STANI~mws].
23 Id., Juvenile Delinquency and Sanctions 2.2-.3; id., Noncriminal Misbehavior 1.1.
24 See id., Juvenile Delinquency and Sanctions 3.1-.5.
25 Id. 6.1-.4.
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seriousness of the offense and the offender's prior record. 20  Finally,
the standards extend procedural safeguards to the dispositional stage
of the delinquency proceedings. 27
In theory, these standards confront quite successfully the more
egregious failings of the current juvenile justice scheme. The limits
on both the jurisdiction and the dispositional powers of the juvenile
court reduce the potential for overreaching by the state. Juvenile de-
linquency jurisdiction can be invoked only when the juvenile is
charged with specific criminal conduct-that is, conduct causing seri-
ous harm to someone other than the juvenile himself or a member of
his family 2 8-and he intended, knew, or should have known the con-
sequences of his action. 29 The standards that require the judge to
impose the least restrictive available disposition3" and to supply
reasons on the record for that disposition 31 mitigate the danger of
excessive sanctions-a peril further avoided by the limitation on cus-
todial dispositions to two years (or three for multiple offenders). 32
In addition, the incorporation into the dispositional proceedings
of adversarial procedures required at the adjudicatory stages but-
tresses procedural fairness. 33 The Joint Commission apparently rec-
ognized that dispositional proceedings are often more significant in
terms of "grievous loss" than the original adjudication of delin-
quency. 34 The dispositional inequities so common in the present sys-
tem, moreover, are met with a grid system of maximum sentences
proportional to the seriousness of the offense, 35 thus restricting the
enormous discretion currently evidenced by indeterminate sentences
putatively based on the "needs" of the juvenile.
One area the Joint Commission does not successfully address is
the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. This failure is perhaps to be
expected, for the rehabilitative ideal itself hs recently come under
26 Id. 6.2.
27 See id., Dispositional Procedures.
U Id., Juvenile Delinquency and Sanctions 1.3, 2.2-.3.
29 Id. 3.1-.2. In addition, other volumes of the Standards authorize "adjustmont" of
cases-dismissal or nonjudicial disposition-at the intake stage in situations In which Juvenills
are deemed not to be proper subjects for juvenile court jurisdiction. See id., Prosecution 4.1,
3; id., The Juvenile Probation Function 2.1-.16.
30 Id., Dispositions 2.1.
31 Id., Dispositional Procedures 7.1(A)(2).
32 Id., Juvenile Delinquency and Sanctions 6.2(A)(1), .3(B)(2).
3 See id., Dispositional Procedures 2.1-7.1.
34Id., Introduction at 2, 9-13.
35 Id., Juvenile Delinquency and Sanctions 6.2(A).
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attack on both theoretical and pragmatic grounds. 36 Thus it is not
surprising that the standards in this area reflect often contradictory
and sometimes troublesome principles. For example, in proposing a
delinquency jurisdiction based on penal rather than parental consid-
erations-that is, one applicable to the legally guilty, not the merely
troubled, youth-the standards reject the concept of therapeutic in-
tervention as the cornerstone for delinquency jurisdiction. 37 One
might logically anticipate a concomitant rejection of any "right"
existing in the juvenile to rehabilitative services, a right vhich some
courts have argued is a necessary implication of a therapeutically
based system. 38 The Joint Commission, however, proposes to retain
and indeed enlarge the notion of a juvenile's right to services, 39
suggesting that, although a juvenile should not be forced to accept
services, 40 a failure to provide them should justify a reduction in the
severity of the disposition or an outright discharge.41 The fit is an
awkward one. 42
Also puzzling is the standards' almost total failure to acknowledge
directly the social interest in protecting society from crime. Perhaps
society is thought best protected by achieving a fairer system ofjuvenile justice, one that respects the liberty and privacy interests of
young people. Or perhaps the goal has been abandoned altogether
because it conflicts with the Joint Commission's overriding concern
with limiting state intervention. But surely society has a legitimate
interest in identifying and restraining those who demonstrate persis-
tent criminal behavior and thus one might legitimately question
a' See, e.g., E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIuINALs 188-91 (1975); Martinson, supra
note 9, at 25-38; Abram, Social Risk Sentencing, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25. 1977, at 1, col. 2.
STANDm s, supra note 22, Noncriminal Misbcharor 1.1 & Introduction at 2.
E.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 358-60 (7th Cir. 1974); Martarella v. Kelley, 349
F. Supp. 575, 585, 598-600 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); cf. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451. 452-56 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (right to treatment for involuntarily committed mental patients).
39 STANDARDS, supra note 22, Dispositions 4.1.
40 Id. 4.2.
41 Id. 4.1(D).
42 See Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. Cmi. L RE,.
755, 762 (1969) (arguing that the "right to treatment" implies a duty to accept treatment, and
thus could result in greater state intervention); ef. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
578-79 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (patients refusal to accept psychiatric treatment should
be considered in assessing defendant hospital's good faith defense against charge that hospital
unconstitutionally confined civilly committed defendant). It could be argued that the standards
indirectly impose some obligation to accept treatment, since acceptance of treatment may be
made a condition of probation. STANDARDS, supra note 22. Dispositions 3.2(D). If treatment Is
made a condition of probation, failure to comply may justify imposition or a more severe sanc-
tion. Id. 5.4.
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whether the maximum sentence lengths allowed under the standards
are sufficient. While the standards seek to limit the acts triggering
delinquency jurisdiction to "adult" offenses, they do not permit
"adult" sanctions: an adult committing murder risks life in prison; a
juvenile committing the same act faces two years. 43 Even the most
assiduous skeptics of deterrence rationales might find that contrast
questionable.
In the final analysis, however, one central thesis can be gleaned
from the principles reflected in the standards, namely, that state in-
tervention into the lives of children and their families should be
minimized. The standards repudiate the idea that the state, in the
form of the juvenile court and under the guise of omniscient benefac-
tor, is best able to effect social goals relating to child development.
By drastically curtailing the juvenile court's discretion and imposing
procedural safeguards, the standards create a strong presumption
against juvenile court jurisdiction and in favor of family supervision
and treatment of minors. But the more important question is, of
course, whether the standards in operation would make any practical
difference in the outcome of juvenile delinquency cases.
II
Tested against the principle of limiting state intervention, the
practical consequences of the standards may not, in our view, fulfill
their theoretical promise. This conclusion is largely owing to the
strong incentives contained in the standards for juveniles to plea bar-
gain, incentives absent in the traditional juvenile justice system and
ones likely to increase court intervention in the lives of juveniles.
In the traditional system, a juvenile proceeding results in either
an adjudication of delinquency or a dismissal.44 When the former
43 See STANDARDS, supra note 22, Juvenile Delinquency and Sanctions 6.2(A)(1). A multi-
ple offender can receive a three-year sentence. Id. 6.3(B)(2). The standards authorize transfelr of
a limited group of serious cases to the adult criminal court. Id., Prosecution 4.3(A)(3). A motion
to transfer a case to the criminal court may be filed only if the youth was at least 16 years of ago
at the time of the offense, and there is clear and convincing evidence (a) that the crime commit-
ted was a "class one juvenile offense" (punishable for an adult by at least 20 years in prison); (b)
that the juvenile has a prior record of adjudicated delinquency involving the infliction or threat
of significant bodily injury; (c) that previous dispositions have demonstrated the likely Inefficacy
of the dispositional alternatives available to the juvenile court; and (d) that services and disposl.
tional alternatives available in the criminal justice system are "more appropriate for dealing with
the juvenile's problems and are, in fact, available." Id.
44 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-68(a) (West Supp. 1977); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§§ 751, 752 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1977-1978).
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occurs, the "sentence" imposed is governed by the needs of the
juvenile rather than the number or seriousness of the charges brought
against him or the frequency with which he has appeared before tie
court in the past.4 5 Because there are no separate classes of offenses,
the juvenile cannot reduce his sentence exposure by pleading guilty
to a lesser offense. Indeed, even in jurisdictions with separate provi-
sions for status offenders, the prosecutorial procedures and kinds of
sanctions that might be imposed on a "person in need of supervision"
are quite similar to those applied to juvenile delinquents, 46 and con-
sequently, the juvenile has no incentive to plead guilty to the status
offense in the hope of reducing his sentence risk on any more serious
charges.
By contrast, if the standards for proportional sentencing are
adopted, a juvenile vil be able to reduce his sentence risk by offer-
ing to plead guilty to a lesser offense. The standards create five
classes of offenses, each class defined by the type and duration of the
maximum sanction imposed for the same conduct in the criminal
law. 47 Thus, for example, a "class one" juvenile offense is any viola-
tion which, if committed by an adult, could result in the death sen-
tence or imprisonment from more than twenty years to life.4 8 Con-
sider, then, the juvenile charged with a class two offense, 49 which
imposes a maximum one-year confinement upon conviction,50 and a
class five offense, 51 which could result in only six months probation
without risk of confinement.52 Given the potential for a material re-
duction in the maximum sentence exposure, the temptation to bar-
gain is apparent. 53
45 D. BEsHAov, JUVENILE JUsTCE ADvOCAcY 373 (1973); see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
17-68 (West Supp. 1977); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 753 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978).
46 See Note, Ungovernability, supra note 11, at 1389-91. Some states Include status of-
fenses in the definition of juvenile delinquency, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-53 (West
Supp. 1977), while others designate status offenders as "persons in need of supervision," e.g.,
N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 712(b) (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978), or "minors in need of supervision,-
e.g., Juvenile Ct. Act § 2-3, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-3 (1973).






w The standards, although authorizing plea bargaining, id., Prosecution 5.1(A). prohibit the
prosecutor from agreeing on the disposition he will recommend to the court, id. The pros-
ecutor, however, may still bargain concerning the petitions that will be filed. Id. 5.4, commen-
tary at 68.
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Despite its surface appeal, the creation of a plea-bargain envi-
ronment would probably result in substantially greater judicial inter-
vention into the lives of children and their families. First, crowded
dockets and reluctant witnesses often result in dismissals for failure of
the state to proceed to trial. A juvenile who pleads guilty, therefore,
forfeits the opportunity for such a dismissal. Second, and on a far
more important level, bargained pleas under the standards, even
when followed by lenient dispositions, nonetheless represent adjudi-
cations of delinquency n4 with their attendant stigma and collateral
consequences. 55
The likelihood of increased adjudications of delinquency under
the standards can best be seen by applying their provisions to some
representative cases. In recent years, the writers have represented a
large number of juveniles in delinquency proceedings in New Haven.
We have selected four typical cases in the hope that, by comparing
the actual outcomes under the present system with the predicted
outcomes under the standards, the practical impact of the Joint
Commission's proposals can be assessed.
Case One: Bobby D.
At age 14, Bobby D. was charged with criminal trespass. He had
no prior record. While walking across the Yale campus with several
friends, he was arrested by New Haven police officers responding to
a report of an attempted burglary involving several black youths. The
case was dismissed when the campus police declined to testify against
him on the trespass charge.
Under the proposed standards, the case would be dismissed even
if the campus police pursued the charge. The standards only invoke
delinquency jurisdiction for acts that would constitute a crime if
committed by an adult. Under the applicable adult criminal trespass
statute 56 culpability can arise only if "No Trespassing" signs are
posted. Because Yale does not post such signs, Bobby's case would be
dismissed regardless of the complainants' willingness to testify.
Several months after the trespassing incident, Bobby was
charged with attempted robbery, assault, and carrying a dangerous
Id., Adjudication 5.1.
5 The drafters of the standards acknowledge the disabilities imposed by an adjudication of
delinquency. Id., Noncriminal Misbehavior, Introduction at 12-13; cf. Note, Ungovernabilty,
supra note 11, at 1401 n.116 (discussing stigma of being labeled a status offender).
6 CONN. GEr. STAT. ANN. § 53a-109 (West 1972).
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weapon. The police report stated that several youths, Bobby among
them, had demanded money from another youth and that Bobby had
hit the victim with a black jack. The case was dismissed because the
victim failed to appear in court on the day of the trial.
Although under both the current and the proposed juvenile jus-
tice systems the victim's failure to appear at trial would lead to
dismissal of the charge, in practice the result under the Joint Com-
mission's scheme would likely be fundamentally different as a con-
sequence of pretrial events. The most serious charge against Bobby
was the attempted robbery count, %vhich carries a maximum adult
sentence of twenty years. In the proposed juvenile sanctions grid, the
crime would thus fall into "class tvo," with a maximum juvenile sen-
tence of twelve months.5 7 Because the traditional juvenile justice
system, at the adjudicatory and dispositional stages, does not consider
the seriousness or the number of charges involved, Bobby would
have nothing to gain by pleading guilty. Under the standards, the
number and seriousness of the charges are the chief determinants of
disposition. 58 Facing a serious charge and the possibility of a yearus
confinement, Bobby would have to consider certain factors before
trial: with actual harm charged, there would be no chance of the dis-
cretionary dismissal permitted in the standards for de minimis infrac-
tions; 59 since Bobby claimed to have an alibi, the standards providing
for affirmative defenses like consent 60 or lack of mens rea G' would be
inapplicable. In all likelihood, he would opt to plead guilty to a lesser
charge-perhaps breach of the peace, with a maximum sanction of six
months of conditional freedom. 62 Instead of the dismissal under the
current system, there would be an adjudication of delinquency with
the attendant state intervention.
In a third encounter with the law, Bobby was charged with rob-
bery. According to the police account, two youths were seen grabbing
a nonagenarian woman, taking her purse, and throwing her to the
ground. Bobby was arrested with the woman's change purse and keys
in his possession. The case was dismissed because the victim was too
weak to testify.





6 See id. 6.2(A)(5)(b).
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In this instance too, the standards would encourage an early plea
bargain and thus the application of some sanction in a case in which
the traditional system would produce a dismissal. Of course, the out-
come under the standards might be perceived by most people as so-
cially preferable-the evidence against Bobby was, after all, very
strong, and the dismissal of the case seems uncomfortably fortuitous.
But such feelings obscure the underlying issue. If the actual outcome
is unpalatable, it should be changed by a straightforward modification
of substantive rules, not by means of increased and undue pressure
on the juvenile to plea bargain.
Bobby's final contact with the juvenile court system was an arrest
for disorderly conduct-shouting obscenities at a passing police car.
The case was dismissed after an apology to the police officer. The
same result would likely obtain under the standards through invoca-
tion of the de minimis discretionary dismissal section. 63
In sum, then, were Bobby's cases to arise under the standards,
the results would be identical in two instances and more severe in
two others. Importantly, however, the latter two results would be
more severe not because of a direct application of substantive law,
but only because of the pressure to plea bargain before trial.
Case Two: Lynn B.
At age 15 and with no prior record, Lynn B. was charged with
criminal mischief and attempted burglary. A police officer observed
Lynn standing in front of a store at night with a can opener in her
hand. Upon investigation, the officer found graffiti on the door and
scratches around the door knob. The case was dismissed with Lynn's
promise to repaint the door.
Under the standards, the maximum sanction for criminal mischief
and attempted burglary would be six months in custody,6 4 a class
three offense. The most probable disposition would be a plea to the
lesser offense, criminal mischief (Lynn admitted responsibility for the
graffiti), and a sentence suspended on condition of repainting the
door. The standards thus would reach the same result as the tradi-
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Case Three: Sean B.
Sean B. had previously been adjudicated delinquent on charges
of truancy and running away from home. The juvenile court had
committed him to a nonsecure residential facility. He then ran away
from the institution and returned home, for which he was charged
with escape. The disposition of the case resulted in the revocation of
his previous commitment, a new adjudication of delinquency based
on the escape, and unsupervised probation.
Under the standards, the escape charge, a class two offense, would
carry a maximum sanction of twelve months in custody. 65 The con-
finement from which Sean escaped, however, bad been based on two
status offenses, which under the standards would not confer jurisdic-
tion on the juvenile court in the first place 66 and thus Sean's case
would be dismissed without even the initial adjudication of delin-
quency.
Case Four: Danny S.
By the time Danny S.'s case came to trial, he had accumulated
nine separate charges against him: two counts of burglary, three
counts of criminal mischief, and one count each of disorderly conduct,
truancy, possession of marijuana, and being beyond the control of his
parent. Most of the misbehavior had occurred at Danny's grand-
father's house, where Danny had lived until a year before his trial.
Although most of the charges were dismissed, Danny was adjudicated
a delinquent based on a finding that he was beyond the control of his
mother and he was committed for one year to a nonsecure residential
drug treatment facility.
Almost all of the charges against Danny involved difficulties with
his family and thus would be dismissed outright were the standards in
effect: the standards provide for discretionary dismissal of delin-
quency proceedings vhen the persons whose interests are threatened
or harmed by the alleged misbehavior are members of the juvenile's
family. 67 The standards also remove juvenile court jurisdiction over
the marijuana charges and any other "victimless" crimes " as well as
-Id. 6.2(A)(2).
r Id. 2.3.
67 Id. 1.3(A). Dismissal should only occur, however, if the court believes that the juveniles
conduct can be better dealt with by parental rather than penal authority. Id. & commentary at
13.
" Id. 2.4(A).
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those noncriminal acts such as truancy believed more appropriately
handled by school officials and parents. 69 Accordingly, under the
standards, the probability is that no adjudication of delinquency
would occur.
If, as we believe, these four cases represent a fairly typical
cross-section of juvenile offenders, the application of the standards to
them suggests somewhat disturbing possibilities. In two of the cases,
the standards would yield less intrusive results, but in the other two
cases the standards would have the effect of increasing state interven-
tion by encouraging pretrial plea bargains. Not only does that effect
contradict the articulated goal of the Joint Commission, but it also
creates an incentive for prosecutors to overcharge juveniles in the
hope of securing a "better" bargain, a not uncommon and often
criticized practice in the adult criminal justice system.70 Indeed,
overcharging could also be used to circumvent the limits placed on
delinquency jurisdiction through the simple device of characterizing
otherwise noncriminal conduct as criminal mischief, thereby under-
mining every premise on which the standards rest. These possibilities
intimate that the Joint Commission may have felt itself too tied to the
framework of the past, despite its admirable recognition of the basic
deficiencies of that framework.
III
The juvenile justice standards contained in the three volumes
that we have considered advocate gradualist reforms-procedural
safeguards, a right to treatment, and limits on both jurisdiction and
the exercise of discretion. The principles guiding these standards, we
suggest, point the way to more radical change, namely, the abolition
of juvenile court delinquency jurisdiction.
The Joint Commission's rejection of the conventional "no fault"
approach and corresponding adoption of mens rea requirements, de-
grees of offenses, proportional and determinate sentencing, and
quasi-criminal affirmative defenses, when coupled with the elimina-
tion of jurisdiction over noncriminal behavior and victimless crimes,
bespeak the abandonment of paternalism and the acceptance of a
criminal law model of juvenile justice. These reforms eliminate the
unique features of the juvenile court's approach to deviant behavior
69 Id. 2.3; id., Noncriminal Misbehavior 1.1.
70 See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cut. L. REv. 50, 97-90
(19m).
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and transform the system into one that focuses, as well it should, on
questions of crime and punishment, guilt and innocence.
One must admire the courage of the drafters of these standards,
for they have relinquished long-accepted therapeutic pretensions and
euphemistic terminology in favor of acknowledging the concerns of
law enforcement and individual rights in a fresh and forthright man-
ner. Even though the drafters eschewed the final step-abolition of
delinquency jurisdiction-the impetus provided by their proposals is
apparent and welcome. But if the goal-and limit-of juvenile de-
linquency proceedings is to be prosecution and sentencing of criminal
offenders, if sentencing is to be proportional to the seriousness of the
criminal offense and prior record of the offender, and if participation
in rehabilitative programs by incarcerated offenders is to be volun-
tary, then how do juvenile delinquency proceedings differ from
criminal proceedings?
The only real differences between these standards and the adult
criminal codes are that the former provide for shorter sentences 7'
and introduce certain special defenses. 72 That an adult court is capa-
ble of dispensing lenient sentences when appropriate, however, is
self-evident. And the principles represented by the standards' special
defenses are already taken into consideration by adult criminal courts
in those instances in which they have dealt with youthful offenders.
Criminal court prosecutors and judges, for example, regularly grant
youthful offender treatment 73 or "diversion" programs 74 to minors
without previous criminal involvement. When no real harm has been
done, or mitigating circumstances appear, prosecutors typically
"nolle" charges and judges dismiss the cases. Although the regulation
of this discretion directly by statutes similar to the standards may be
desirable, such regulations could just as easily occur in the context of
an adult criminal court.
Perhaps a separate juvenile justice system was justifiable when
its rules of adjudication and liability were different from those of its
adult counterpart, but if we are to accept the Joint Commission's
move to a penal model of juvenile justice, this justification evapo-
71 See text accompanying note 43 infra.
72 These include the defenses of immaturity, STANDAnDS, supra note 22. Jurenle Delin-
quency and Sanctions 3.2; parental authority, id. 3.4(B); family victim, id. 1.3(A); and absence
of actual harm, id. 1.3(B)(1).
73 For the statutory basis of such actions in Connecticut, see Co.N. GC&I. STAT. ANN. §
54-76b to -76p (West Supp. 1977).
74 For a statutory example, see id. § 5 4 -7 6 p.
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rates. Indeed, that procedural safeguards are still in their infancy in
juvenile courts suggests that the youthful offender may affirmatively
benefit from having his case heard in an adult court where such
safeguards are taken for granted. The role strain created for lawyers
by the "benevolent" juvenile court, moreover, would not exist and
defense counsel would experience no difficulty in assuming their
traditional and proper adversary role. 75
Although it would be unrealistic and unfair to deny that most
children-including juvenile delinquents-are more immature, de-
pendent, and irresponsible than most adults, it beggars belief to pre-
tend that we incarcerate a youth who has robbed and beaten an el-
derly person for the same reason that we place in protective care a
child who has been abused by his parents. Whatever rationale is
thought to underlie the criminal justice system-deterrence, segrega-
tion, retribution, or even rehabilitation-can bear little relationship
to the substitute child-rearing model of nondelinquency juvenile
court activity. The functions of the jailer and the social worker have
little in common and any attempt to combine the two inevitably de-
creases the effectiveness of each.
Accordingly, while we appreciate the force of Judge Polier's dis-
sent to these standards, in which she characterizes them as an unfor-
tunate retreat from service-oriented and individualized treatment, 70
we believe that rather than going too far, the standards do not go far
enough. In our judgment, juvenile court delinquency jurisdiction
should be abolished and the jurisdiction of the juvenile court re-
served for the protection of abused, neglected, and emotionally dis-
turbed children. 77 The need for a separate delinquency jurisdiction
ends where the penal model of juvenile justice begins: surely an adult
court is just as competent to weigh factors like diminished responsi-
bility and lack of mens rea as a juvenile court. Thus, while the stan-
75 See Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and
Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7, 35, 39; Wizner, The Child and the State, supra note 18, at 396-99.
76 STANDARDS, supra note 22, Juvenile Delinquency and Sanctions, Dissenting Views at
50-51 (statement of Commissioner Justine Wise Polier).
77 Even this aspect of juvenile court jurisdiction is not without controversy. It has been
argued that broadly worded statutes allow an unfortunate amount of coercive intervention Into
family lives under the rubric of the "best interests of the child" standard. See, e.g., id., Abuse
and Neglect, Introduction at 1-3; Lowry, The Judge v. the Social Worker: Can Arbitrary Dc-
cisionmaking Be Tempered by the Courts?, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1033 (1977); Mnooldn, Child Cus.
tody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminancy, 39 LAW & CONTSMP.
PROB. 226, 262-72 (1976).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol, 52,:1120
HeinOnline -- 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1134 1977
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS
dards are an excellent attempt at reform of a system that desperately
needs reform, they fail to carry through their underlying premises.
The drafters may not believe so, but their work is the first step on a
path that appears to lead ineluctably to the abolition of juvenile court
jurisdiction over criminal acts.
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